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SEXUAL MINORITIES AND ASYLUM LAW: SOME DOORS REMAIN UNOPENED  
 
NICK CORSANO 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Sexual and gender minorities have consistently been left out, over-looked or 
simply forgotten when protections from discrimination are afforded to particular social 
groups.  Whether it was because of disapproval or lack of visibility, gender and sexual 
minorities have not been socially accepted to constitute people who can be defined within 
the clear-cut confines of a particular group.  Immigration law did not fail to follow suit in 
lacking the adequate definitions and enumerations to protect sexual and gender minorities 
seeking asylum. 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act enumerates quite a few social groups whose 
members can claim asylum if they are persecuted for their membership or association 
within that group.
1
  Not completely unaware that there may be groups of people that do 
not fall under one of the enumerated categories, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
allows for members of “a particular social group” to claim asylum if he or she can prove 
their membership was or will be the source of their persecution.
2
  This is the gateway 
group for sexual and gender minorities to claim asylum for persecution based on this 
characteristic. 
 Sexual and gender minority is not met with ease in defining what would constitute 
a particular social group.  Through an order by the Attorney General defining gays and 
lesbians as a protected “particular social group” in 1990 and a few defining cases handed 
                                                 
1
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778 (2010).  
2
 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(1), (b)(1) (2003).  
 2 
down by the circuit courts, have caused “a particular social group” to slowly but 
sufficiently broadened itself to incorporate sexual and gender minorities.
3
   
 These cases demonstrate a developing jurisprudence for the protection of asylum 
seekers based on sexual and gender minorities persecuted for the immutable and/or innate 
characteristics expressed as integral parts of their identities.  However, they also bring to 
light the difficulties surrounding the protection of an innate, yet non-physical 
characteristic.  As cases involving sexual and gender minorities that display outward 
manifestations of their “particular social group” are easier in a sense to evaluate, the 
immigration courts stifle when dealing with individuals who possess the immutable 
characteristic but don’t exhibit outward manifestations.4  The courts attempted to remedy 
these situations by stating that evidence of past persecution will automatically instill a 
valid fear of future persecution and denial may only be granted on proof of evidence to 
change of circumstances offered proved the government.
5
  This does not provide a 
solution however for those individuals who fail to have a past experience of persecution, 
but are still in danger due to their membership in the particular social group of sexual or 
gender minority.  
 In order to remedy the problems of persecution facing sexual and gender 
minorities the courts have attempted to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act in a 
favorable light to allow for those persecuted on the basis of a non-physical characteristic.  
This Note will examine the interactions of sexual and gender minorities with asylum law 
                                                 
3
 Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 784 (9
th
 Cir. 2004); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 
F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9
th
 Cir. 
2000); Opinion of Attorney General Order no. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).  
4
 In re Soto Vega, No. A-9880786, at 3 (Immigration Ct. Jan. 21, 2003). 
5
 Vega v. Gonzalez, 183 Fed. Appx. 627, 629 (9
th
 Cir. 2006). 
 3 
and the expansions and contractions taken in establishing standards for the granting or 
denial of asylum for persecution based on membership in a “particular social group.”  
Part I examines the foundations of asylum law and its applications.  Part II looks over the 
considerations and reasoning behind the circuit split in defining what constitutes a 
particular social group.  Part III discusses the circuit split over whether punitive intent is 
necessary for whether treatment of an individual constitutes persecution.  Part IV 
discusses homosexuality defined as a particular social group.  Part V discusses the 
difficulties in defining transsexual and transgender as a particular social group.  Part V 
also looks at the ideas of soft immutability and the Imputed Identity Doctrine.  Part VI 
examines the importance of physical manifestation when determining an individual’s 
membership in a particular social group.  Part VI also discusses the ideas of covering and 
reverse covering.  Throughout the Note there will be analysis of the procedural and 
policy precedents in place and their affect on sexual and gender minorities seeking 
asylum, concluding that courts should hold firm to practices that allow for the protection 
of those persecuted because of an actual or perceived immutable or innate characteristic 
core to their identity, regardless of how well their “particular social group” can be 
defined.      
    
I. ASYLUM LAW: DEFINITION AND PRACTICE 
 Asylum claims in the United States are governed by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).
6
  The Department of Homeland Security and the Justice 
                                                 
6
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778 (2010); Stephen Yale-Loehr, Sean Koehler, Overview of the U.S. 
Immigration Law, 139 PLI/NY 11, 16-17 (2004).  
 4 
Department govern the INA regulations.
7
  When granted asylum the alien may be eligible 
for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to § 209 of the 
Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159, after residing in the United States one year, 
subject to numerical limitation and the applicable regulations.
8
  The regulations prescribe 
that when the alien applies for an adjustment to “permanent resident,” he or she has to 
have been physically present in the United States for at least one year after being granted 
asylum, continued to be a refugee within the meaning of Section 101(a)(42)(A), 8 USCS 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)
9
 or as a spouse or child of such a refugee, is not firmly resettled in any 
foreign country, and is admissible as an immigrant under this Act at the time of 
examination for adjustment of the alien.
10
  
Cases of asylum are heard first in the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR).
11
  If the immigration judge finds that removal of the applicant is proper, the 
applicant may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
12
  An individual 
member of the BIA is authorized to affirm the decision of an immigration judge without 
opinion if he or she determines that any errors that may exist in the decisions are 
                                                 
7
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778; Koehler, supra note 6, at 16-17. 
8
 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987). 
9
 The term "refugee" means: 
 (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.  
    8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2010). 
10
 8 U.S.C § 1159(b)(1)-(5) (2005).  
11
 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 254, 256 (4
th
 ed. 1998).  
12
 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (2003). 
 5 
“harmless or nonmaterial,” or the issue on appeal is “squarely controlled by existing 
Board or federal court precedent,” or that the “questions raised on appeal are so 
insubstantial” that a panel is unnecessary.13  Finally, if the BIA denies the application, the 
applicant may raise their case on appeal to the federal circuit court for review in the 
circuit in which they are located.
14
 When the BIA issues an opinion that does not adopt 
the decision of an immigration judge, the BIA’s opinion becomes the basis for judicial 
review of the decision of which the alien is complaining.
 15
   Though the federal court has 
the ability to clarify the law, they cannot define factually what does or does not constitute 
asylum eligibility regarding an administrative judgment.
16
    
A court of appeals reviewing an asylum claim is not generally empowered to 
conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter and reach its own conclusions based on that 
inquiry; proper conduct, except in rare circumstances, would be for the court to remand 
back to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.
17
  The agency (BIA) is 
entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA.
18
   If the appeal to 
the Court of Appeals is successful, the court’s decision is then binding on the BIA and 
                                                 
13
 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (2003).  
14
 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2003).  
15
 Fen Yong Chen v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 470 F.3d 509, 513 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Board of Immigration Appeals, JUSTICE.GOV, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm, (last updated April 2011).  
16
 Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006). 
17
 Id. 
18
 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522 (2009).  This course of remand will play an 
integral role in the progression of asylum cases regarding homosexuals, as the BIA is the 
agency that ultimately should define what does, or does not constitute a “particular group 
of society.”    
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lower immigration judges for cases that arise within that circuit.
19
  Only a decision from 
the Supreme Court would affect all immigration courts, but they infrequently give 
certiorari to immigration cases.   
The Attorney General has the authority to overrule decisions of the BIA and can 
establish clarity among the law, by determining what should be held as precedent.
20
  
Federal Regulations permit the Attorney General to intervene in the appeals process by 
certifying a BIA decision to himself, or by accepting referral from the Board or the 
Department of Homeland Security.
21
  Once the referral has been made to the Attorney 
General, the BIA decision is no longer final and cannot be used as precedent or reviewed 
by a federal court.
22
  The decisions issued by the Attorney General in these instances 
become the final agency decision and serve as precedent, binding future cases.
23
        
 Asylum may be initiated in two manners.  A “defensive application” for asylum 
occurs when removal proceedings
24
 have begun and the alien raises an asylum claim as 
grounds for relief from deportation.
25
  Conversely, as the name suggests, an “affirmative 
application” for asylum occurs when the applicant is legally present and makes his or her 
claim outright in order to obtain asylum status.
26
  Regarding persecution based on sexual 
                                                 
19
 Stuart Frider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States – In re 
Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
213, 215 (1994).  
20
 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2003).  
21
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2008). 
22
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1); Attorney General Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001) 
(attached to E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 700, 701 (AG 2004)).  
23
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2008).  
24
 Removal proceedings are governed and defined by I.N.A. 239, 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229-
1229(a) (2003). 
25
 Vicente A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum 
Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 423 (1994). 
26
 Id. at 422-23. 
 7 
orientation or gender, whether asylum is raised as a “defensive” or an “affirmative” 
measure should have no impact on deciding whether to grant asylum or not.  Using the 
manner in which asylum is sought to rebut the validity of the claim based on sexual 
orientation or gender would be inappropriate given the lack of clarity in the application of 
this “particular social group” as it is.    
Under Title 8, an alien has to prove that race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion, was or will be at least one central reason for 
which he or she was or will be persecuted.
27
  The United States Supreme Court has 
established a two-step process for reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute.  First, 
if the congressional purpose is clear, courts and administrative agencies must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
28
  The second level of review is 
triggered when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.
29
  
When the statute is silent the court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
30
     
Evidentiary support is essential to establishing that one was or will be subjected to 
persecution.  The BIA laid out in the Matter of Acosta that in order for the alien to show 
that it is likely he will become the victim of persecution, his evidence must demonstrate 
that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to extinguish in 
others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could 
easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the 
persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the 
                                                 
27
 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2003).  
28
 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
29
 Id. at 843. 
30
 Id. at 844.  
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inclination to punish the alien.
31
 In addition, the statutory standard for asylum requires 
the facts to show that an alien’s primary motivation for requesting refuge in the United 
States is “fear,” i.e., a genuine apprehension or awareness of danger in another country.32  
The requirement of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” set out by section 
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, has been interpreted by the BIA to mean that an individual’s 
fear of persecution must have its basis in external, or objective, facts that show there is a 
realistic likelihood he will be persecuted upon his return to a particular country.
33
  This 
requires that the alien show his fear has a solid basis in objective facts or events and that 
it is likely he will become the victim of persecution.
34
  
The “well-founded fear of persecution” standard involves both a subjectively 
genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable possibility of persecution.
35
  
The subjective component requires that the applicant have a genuine concern that he or 
she will be persecuted, and may be satisfied by the applicant’s testimony that he or she 
genuinely fears persecution.
36
  The objective component requires that the alien establish a 
reasonable fear of persecution by credible, direct, and specific evidence.
37
  The applicant 
is not however required to present proof that the persecution is more likely than not; one 
can have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50 percent 
chance of the occurrence taking place.
38
   
                                                 
31
 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 1985). 
32
 Id. at 221. 
33
 Id. at 225.  
34
 Id.  
35
 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 430-31. 
36
 Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9
th
 Cir. 1997). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
 9 
To satisfy the objective prong of having a well-founded fear of future persecution, 
an applicant must show that he would be individually singled out for persecution or 
demonstrate that there is a pattern or practice in his country of persecution of a group of 
persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
39
  The immigration judge 
shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that he would be singled out 
individually for persecution if he establishes his inclusion in and identification with 
similarly situated groups of persons against which there is a pattern or practice of 
persecution in his country on account of the five statutory grounds for asylum.
40
  It is 
therefore inappropriate to delve into the subjective levels of the person’s individual 
experience with a particular social group, if there is clear evidence that the applicant does 
in fact belong to the persecuted particular group.    
In the Matter of Acosta, the BIA interpreted persecution of this kind to mean 
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons 
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic; one that might be innate such as 
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience 
such as former military leadership or land ownership.
41
  No matter what the common 
characteristic, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.
42
   
                                                 
39
 Vasquez-Ramirez v. Attorney General United States, 315 Fed. Appx. 381, 382 (3
rd
 Cir. 
2009). 
40
 Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1
st
 Cir. 1994). 
41
 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-234. 
42
 Id. 
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In applying the Acosta formula, the BIA focuses on the two major considerations 
of immutability and social visibility.
43
  The BIA has noted that a past experience is by its 
very nature, immutable.
44
  The event has already occurred and cannot be undone; 
however, this fact does not mean that any past experience shared by people suffices to 
define a particular social group for asylum purposes.
45
  The Agency is careful to police its 
interpretation of the “particular social group” so not to over broaden the requirements 
necessary to obtain asylum.  “Particular social group” should not be a “catch all” for all 
persons alleging asylum that do not fit within another enumerated category.
46
  This means 
that the risk of persecution alone does not create a particular social group within the 
meaning of the INA.
47
   
II. THE THREEWAY SPLIT OVER A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced that Toboso-Alfonso would act 
as precedent for all cases concerning the same or similar issues.
48
  The case stated an 
“individual who has been identified as a homosexual and persecuted by his government 
for that reason alone may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of 
persecution because of membership in a particular social group.”49  The Attorney General 
ordered that this opinion act as precedent in all proceedings involving issues relating to 
all sexual orientation claims.
50
  The new standard lead to the three-ways circuit split that 
                                                 
43
 Castillo-Arias v. United States Attorney General, 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11
th
 Cir. 2006). 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 1198. 
47
 Id.  
48
 Opinion of Attorney General Order No. 1895- 94 (June 19, 1994). 
49
 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I.&N. Dec. 819, 819 n.1 (B.I.A. 1990). 
50
 Opinion of Attorney General Order No. 1895- 94. 
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has evolved in evaluating what constitutes a particular social group, especially when 
dealing with non-physical, immutable or innate characteristics.   
The First Circuit,
51
 Third Circuit,
52
 and Seventh Circuit,
53
 have all followed the 
standard set out by the BIA in Acosta in determining a member of a “particular social 
group” when reviewing applications for asylum.  The guidelines set out above are what 
these Circuits adhere to, and they aim to determine if the persecution is because of 
membership in a particular social group, whose members share a common, immutable 
characteristic.
54
  The First Circuit, while adhering to the standard laid out in Acosta, 
narrowed the standard a bit more in their analysis by emphasizing another section of the 
INA.  Even if an alien asserts a fear of future persecution by local functionaries, they 
must show that those functionaries have more than a localized reach.
55
  The reasoning is 
that if the potentially troublesome state of affairs is sufficiently localized, an alien can 
avoid persecution by simply relocating within his own country instead of fleeing to a 
foreign nation.
56
  The Immigration and BIA courts within these three circuits are held to 
the standard those circuits and must review asylum cases in that light; here strict 
adherence to the guidelines of the BIA and Acosta.   
The Ninth Circuit has evolved a more liberal take on the standard set out in 
Acosta.  Initially, laying out its opinion in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court defined 
“particular social group” as a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who 
                                                 
51
 Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1 (1
st
 Cir. 2005). 
52
 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 719. 
53
 Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7
th
 Cir. 1998). 
54
 Da Silva, 394 F.3d at 5.  
55
 Id. at 7. 
56
 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2); Da Silva, 394 F.3d at 7. 
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are associated by some common impulse or interest.
57
  The central vein of the court’s 
concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported 
members, which expresses some common characteristic that is fundamental to their 
identity as a member of that discrete social group.
58
  The Ninth Circuit has turned its 
attention towards the associational relationship involving “common 
characteristics…fundamental…to identity.”59  The court speaks to the ability of 
persecution to not only occur based on an immutable characteristic, but also to an 
association, one fundamental to the identity and core of the applicant’s person.  In dealing 
with applications based on sexual orientation, the Ninth Circuit opens itself up to the 
allowance of those who share a common characteristic that may not be immutable but is 
core to their person none-the-less.  Though the Attorney General stated, Toboso- Alfonso 
is precedent, there are subsets of gender identity that are not as clearly defined as the 
homosexuality reviewed in that case.  Those subsets will now have a more reasonable 
chance of success under the altered standard of the Ninth Circuit.   
The Ninth Circuit moved on from Sanchez-Trujillo to Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 
where the court harmonized the previous case with the standard set forth in Acosta.  The 
court expands the definition of “particular social group” in Hernandez-Montiel to include 
“one united by a voluntary association…or by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its member that members cannot or should 
not be required to change it.”60  This standard encompasses the immutable characteristic 
standard laid out in Acosta, but broadens itself to encompass things not necessarily 
                                                 
57
 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9
th
 Cir. 1986). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093.  
 13 
immutable, but crucial to a person’s identity none-the-less.  This broadened standard 
makes asylum more accessible to the LGBT community. There are subsets and intricacies 
involved in sexual orientation and gender identity that possess qualities not necessarily 
immutable, but unchangeable and innate to the individual, suggesting that they should not 
be required to be changed.   
Lastly, the Second Circuit removes analysis from the individual claiming asylum 
and observes the actions and objectives of his or her persecutor.  The Second Circuit 
focuses its opinion around perception in Gomez v. INS.   The idea of perception opens the 
claim of asylum to a broader range of victims, who would otherwise rely solely on 
establishing that they are part of a particular social group based on an immutable 
characteristic or a characteristic so innate they should not be required to change it.  In 
Gomez, the Second Circuit defined “particular social group” as one “comprised of 
individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to 
distinguish them in the eyes of the persecutor…or in the eyes of the outside world in 
general.”61  This standard removes the claim from a basis of actual identity, to one of 
perceived identity, which in many cases is the basis for persecution or victimization to 
begin with; which other statutes in the United States allow for, holding the attacker 
equally as culpable as if their persecution was based on actual, rather than perceived 
knowledge.
62
  The standard upheld by the Second Circuit opens up asylum claims to 
those that would otherwise be at a loss.  People persecuted because of their perceived 
                                                 
61
 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
62
 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act outlaws sexual orientation discrimination in 
the workplace; sexual orientation being defined as homosexuality, bisexuality, or 
heterosexuality, whether the orientation is real or perceived. H.R. 2981 § 3(a)(9), 111
th
 
Cong. (2009). 
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identity may in fact not identify as a member of that group and do not have the 
immutable characteristics of those being persecuted.  Should they be denied asylum and 
forced to endure persecution because of an inaccuracy?  The Second Circuit says no.  
This standard facilitates a means for a great deal of subsets in the LGBT community, 
specifically among the transsexuals and transgender individuals.  Something as difficult 
to explain as transexuality, can be even more difficult when forced to contextualize not 
only what you are but how you, among others, are persecuted for it.  The standard of the 
Second Circuit allows a bit of leniency to the victim as they are not required to clarify 
what they are and how they are part of a “particular social group,” but only that their 
attacker perceives them as such, which usually will fall more smoothly into the binary 
sexual system laid out in the United States.  
III. PUNITIVE INTENT OR NOT?  
 The idea of whether an asylum applicant’s persecutor must have acted with 
punitive intent has caused a split among the circuits.  At least two circuits uphold the idea 
in Matter of Acosta that persecutors must exhibit intent to punish in order for asylum to 
be granted.
63
  Sivaainkaran v. INS, from the Seventh Circuit, involved the denial of 
asylum for a Sri Lankan Applicant because the court felt his situation didn’t merit asylum 
simply because he feared harassment from the conflict between the Buddhist Sinhalese 
and the Hindu/Muslim Tamils.
64
  The court said that persecution has been described as 
“punishment” or “the infliction of harm” for political, religious, or other offensive 
reasons.
65
   
                                                 
63
 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.  
64
 Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F. 2d 161, 165 (7
th
 Cir. 1992).  
65
 Id. 
 15 
 However, in certain circumstances, denial of a privilege in a home country for 
legitimate reasons does not escalate to persecution.  The Fifth Circuit handed down 
Faddoul v INS, where they refused to grant asylum to a Palestinian applicant alleging 
persecution in Saudi Arabia.
66
  The applicant alleged that he and his family were denied 
basic living, citizenship, and exit/ re-entry ability in Saudi Arabia.
67
  The court noted that 
all non-Saudi residents were subject to the same lack of privileges and that this particular 
applicant failed to show that he and his family were being isolated for persecution.
68
  
Additionally, Faddoul failed to show he feared harm as a result of the Saudis’ desire to 
punish him for a particular belief or characteristic; resulting in denial of asylum.
69
   
 The Ninth Circuit deviates from the “intent to punish” standard.  In Pitcherskaia 
v. INS, Pitcherskaia was a registered
70
, suspected lesbian and was ordered to undergo 
treatment at a clinic.  She was diagnosed with “slow-going schizophrenia” and prescribed 
sedatives.
71
  Applicant was arrested twice in the home of a gay friend in 1990 and 1991 
and imprisoned overnight.
72
  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA, the 
Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuits view on what constitutes persecution.
73
  The Ninth 
Circuit held that “persecution” is defined objectively as “the infliction of suffering or 
harm upon those who differ… in a way regarded as offensive.”74  Therefore, the 
subjective motives of the persecutor are irrelevant, for “persecution by any other name 
                                                 
66
 Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5
th
 Cir. 1994).  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. at 189. 
69
 Id. 
70
 In Russia, the government kept records of suspected homosexuals during the 1990’s.  
71
 Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644.  
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 648. 
74
 Id. at 647, (citing Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9
th
 Cir. 1997). 
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remains persecution.”75  The Ninth Circuit remanded the applicant’s case to the BIA, 
stating; “human rights law cannot be sidestepped by simply couching actions that torture 
mentally or physically in benevolent terms such as ‘curing’ or ‘treating’ the victims.”76  
As observed previously, this is now precedent in immigration courts that lie within the 
Ninth Circuit.  Their applicants will have the objective, reasonable person standard, 
removing the protection of misleading terms that may hide the true subjective nature of 
the persecutor’s intent.      
IV. HOMOSEXUALITY AS A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP UNDER 
ASYLUM LAW 
 
Until 1990, homosexuals were formally excluded on the grounds that they were 
“aliens afflicted with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or mental defect.”77  The 
Immigration Act of 1990 removed the bar on admission for homosexuals into the United 
States.
78
  In 1990, in Toboso-Alfonso, a homosexual was deemed a member of a 
particular social group, specifically Cuban gays, and the applicant was permitted to 
successfully allege persecution on that basis to qualify under the statutory definition of 
refugee in Section 101 of the INA.
79
  Subsequent to Toboso-Alfonso, was the case of In re 
Tenorio, decided in 1993, the court granted asylum to a Brazilian gay man who feared 
persecution by paramilitary groups after having been bashed in Rio de Janeiro.
80
  In both 
cases homosexuality served as the basis for claiming membership to a particular social 
                                                 
75
 Id. at 647. 
76
 Id. at 648. 
77
 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 
(1965) (superceded 1990). 
78
 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 (1990). 
79
 Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823. 
80
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group subject to persecution.
81
  However, neither case was assigned precedence at the 
time it was decided.
82
 
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a directive, mandating that the 
immigration system adopt Toboso-Alfonso as precedent “in all proceedings involving the 
same issue or issues.”83  The Attorney General held that “an individual who has been 
identified as a homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone 
may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution because of 
membership in a particular social group.”84  Since the adoption of Toboso-Alfonso, the 
hurdle for gays and lesbians to establish themselves as part of a particular social group 
has been removed by the determination that homosexuality is in fact, a particular social 
group.  However, though gays and lesbians may associate themselves as part of a 
particular social group (sexual and gender minorities) they must still demonstrate the 
subjective and objective fears of persecution required by Matter of Acosta.
85
  They must 
show a nexus between the persecutions they have suffered, or their fear they will suffer 
persecution and their membership to their particular social group (sexual minorities).
86
  
The Mogharrabi test holds that an alien’s fear is reasonable if a reasonable person in a 
similar circumstance would fear future persecution.
87
 Though still faced with the task of 
proving fear of persecution or that of future persecution, gays and lesbians no longer have 
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to worry about proving where they fit in regards to a “particular social group.”88  This is 
still not the case however for those among other sexual and gender minority groups.  
V. DIFFICULTY IN DEFING TRANSEXUALS AND BISEXUALS UNDER 
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” 
 
 
In the case of transsexual and transgender individuals, the argument for asylum 
becomes more difficult.  Though Attorney General Janet Reno affirmed that 
homosexuality does constitute a particular social group upon which asylum claims may 
be based and that Toboso-Alfonso should be adopted as precedent for all cases regarding 
the same issue or issues; 
89
 the courts have not extended this to mean those individuals 
who identify under the headings of transsexual or transgender.  The BIA has never 
formally recognized transgender or transsexuals as a “particular social group,” and no 
federal circuit has defined the standard regarding these individuals directly.  However, 
the Ninth Circuit has issued two decisions that contribute to the protection for 
transgender/sexual asylum seekers.  In Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 
the Ninth Circuit established that “gay men with female sexual identities” comport a 
particular social group,
90
 and then broadly defined this group to encompass a variety of 
gender-based characteristics, consecutively.
91
  These cases are important because they do 
not just gauge these individuals against the particular social group of homosexuality, but 
that of what they really are- sexual minorities.  They establish precedent for the equal 
protection and opportunity to gain asylum for those that don’t conform to stereotypical 
gender norms.   
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Hernandez-Montiel v. INS is a case from the Ninth Circuit issued in 2000.
92
  The 
decision in this case extended protection to Hernandez-Montiel, a transgender asylum 
seeker.
93
  Hernandez-Montiel wore his hair long, had long fingernails, dressed in 
women’s clothing, took female hormones and had same-sex attraction.94  Hernandez-
Montiel claimed that he should be considered as a member of a particular social group – 
gay men with female sexual identities.
95
   
Initially, the Immigration Judge, though finding Hernandez-Montiel credible and 
sincere, denied relief because “homosexual males who wish to dress as a woman” did not 
constitute a particular social group.
96
  The Immigration Judge noted that he could not 
characterize Hernandez-Montiel’s assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental 
to his identity because he alternated between it and his male identity.
97
  The BIA affirmed 
the Immigration Judge’s decision, and found that Hernandez-Montiel faced persecution 
not because of his homosexuality but “because of the way he dressed (as a male 
prostitute)” and that “his decision to dress as a female” was not an immutable 
characteristic.
98
   
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA.
99
  The court laid its 
foundation in establishing the existing precedent, that gays and lesbians are members of a 
                                                 
92
 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1084. 
93
 Id. at 1087. 
94
 Id. at 1088. 
95
 Id. at 1089. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id.  
98
 Id. at 1089-90. 
99
 Id. at 1084. 
 20 
particular social group.
100
  The court then continued on to note that “sexual identity goes 
beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress and 
appearance.”101  The court observed that men who are homosexual in many cases, 
“outwardly manifest their identities through characteristics traditionally associated with 
women, such as feminine dress, long hair and fingernails.”102  The court noted that these 
men may suffer the most serious persecution in certain cultures because they are not only 
homosexual, but additionally they adopt the passive role in the gay relationship, the one 
perceived to be the stereotypical female role.
103
  The court recognized Hernandez-
Montiel as a “homosexual who has taken on a primarily ‘female’ sexual role.”104  The 
court described Hernandez-Montiel as part of the particular social group- “gay men with 
female sexual identities.”105  The court said that Hernandez-Montiel was not a case about 
a man who on occasion puts on a dress to engage in “cross-dressing;” but a case about 
“sexual identity,” manifested in the adoption of gendered traits characteristically 
associated with women.
106
  The sexual identity discussed here that manifests in traits 
characteristically associated with women, also manifests itself in traits characteristically 
associated with transsexuals.  Though the female is the binary category within which 
these traits fall stereotypically, it must also be remembered that these traits are the innate 
traits of the transgender/transsexual.  They are just as much core characteristics of the 
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transsexual as they are of the female and this is the recognition and equation the court has 
not yet reached.         
Though the court never uses the term transsexual or transgender, the Ninth Circuit 
provides opportunity in asylum cases to this group of sexual minorities.  The court 
described these individuals as “gay men with female sexual identities.”107  The court 
makes a statement in saying that sexual identities cannot be as binary as they have been 
perceived in the past.  Sexual identifications cannot be as clear-cut as to fit nicely in the 
package that has been established- homosexuality.  Hernandez-Montiel states “sexual 
identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress 
and appearance.”108  Sexual identification is more than just intercourse as the court 
describes, that is only a piece to the puzzle, which as a whole is identity.  Identity is 
expressed in a multitude of ways.  One example expressed here is dress.
109
  The dress is 
not merely to be taken as protection from the elements or as the court describes, “a 
fashion statement.”110  It is a statement or expression generally of who that person is, the 
identity they hold, and an outward manifestation of the internal immutable characteristics 
that classify them a person, a person whose identity deserves protection from persecution.  
Many groups in society can be classified by their clothing; Goths, Hipsters, Grunge.  
Each of these “particular social groups,” dress in a certain way that make them 
identifiable to the public and to each other.  Their clothing is an extension and 
representation of the beliefs that are core to their identity.  If ever persecuted for these 
beliefs, they hold the necessary requirements for an asylum claim, and it seems that the 
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Ninth Circuit held correctly that the outer manifestation or representation of one’s 
internal identity should not be taken so lightly simply because it is removable.  
In Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit expanded the borders of “gay men 
with female sexual identities.”111  The court noted that the application of this social group 
extends to a man who “dresses and looks like a woman, wears makeup and a women’s 
hairstyle.”112  The counsel in Reyes-Reyes referred to Reyes-Reyes as “transgender,” 
which provided the court the opportunity to redefine, or fuse the concept of transgender 
with the broader definition of “gay men with female sexual identities.”113  The court did 
not avoid referring to Reyes-Reyes as a transgender individual, they noted that Reyes-
Reyes’s “sexual orientation, for which he was targeted and his transsexual behavior are 
intimately connected.”114  Combined with the decision of Hernandez-Montiel, Reyes-
Reyes extends protections under asylum law to those individuals persecuted for their 
sexual identities manifested “beyond conduct, and outwardly expressed through dress and 
appearance.”115 
A. The Soft Immutability Standard 
Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes impose a “soft immutability” standard that 
alters the way in which courts protect the transgender or sexual minority asylum 
seeker.
116
  The soft immutability standard that is established in these cases from the Ninth 
Circuit reduce the need for “scientific or biological” proof of sexual identity through 
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static characteristics by way of chromosomal makeup, sex organs, or the sexual identity 
assigned at birth.
117
  This standard allows for transgender asylum seekers to seek 
protection based on traits adopted over time though still integral to their identity.
118
  They 
expand the definition of what might constitute “immutable.”119  The court’s lenient 
interpretation of immutability allows for individuals to establish identity through traits 
that accurately and fairly represent their identities without biological or scientific 
support.
120
  The Ninth Circuit interprets broadly the original definition of a particular 
social group with this standard, which protects the aspects of identity that a person 
“cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences.”121   
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the latter part of this standard in the proper light.  
The dress, actions and outward traits and expressions of these individuals are 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences and therefore should not be 
required to be changed.  Political association and religious views are protected, non-
physical traits that can constitute a membership to a particular social group, yet their 
outward physical expressions of association are removable.  If an individual goes to bed 
without his yarmulke or prayer shawl on, does he no longer hold Judaism core to his 
identity? If a political activist puts down his flag, has he abandoned his association?  
Though missing the opportunity for analogy in these cases, the Ninth Circuit establishes 
the precedent when dealing with the particular social group of transgender individuals or 
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“gay men with female sexual identities.”  Just because they are able to remove their outer 
garments, makeup, etc, does not mean that they abandon their fundamental identification 
with the particular social group.  Nor does it mean they become any less at risk for 
persecution based upon their association.  Therefore these individuals should be afforded 
the same protection as those who conform within the binary categories of gay and 
lesbian. 
B. The Imputed Identity Doctrine 
Though loosening the stronghold on the definition of immutability, the Ninth 
Circuit still reviews the identity and characteristic of the persecuted and attempts to find 
out if it is core to their person and for which they are persecuted.
122
  There is a third 
standard of review in cases regarding asylum claims based on sexual identity.  That third 
standard concerns the imputed identity doctrine, which concerns not the asylum seeker’s 
identity, but the perceptions and motivations of the persecutor.
123
  If the persecutor 
perceives the individual to be a member of a particular social group and persecutes him 
on that basis, the alien’s actual identity is no longer relevant and he or she should be 
granted asylum on the beliefs and acts of persecution of the persecutor.
124
  The Second 
Circuit includes imputed identity into its definition of a particular social group.
125
  In 
Gomez v INS the court said, “A particular social group is comprised of individuals 
who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to 
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor -- or in the eyes of the outside world in 
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general.”126  This interpretation of the enumerated category, “particular social 
group,” holds important the belief of the persecutor rather than the self-
identification of the alien.  The imputed identity doctrine, allows the alien to claim 
asylum on what he or she is perceived to be by their persecutor, regardless of 
whether they can identify themselves as an actual member of that particular social 
group.   
 The Third Circuit extended imputed identity to sexual-orientation based 
claims in Amanfi v. Ashcroft.
127
  The court reversed a BIA decision that held 
imputed identity was limited to political opinion.
128
  The court held that imputed 
gay identity falls squarely under the BIA’s decision in In re S-P, a case that 
extended asylum to an applicant who faced persecution on account of his imputed 
political views.
129
  In re S-P- held that “persecution for ‘imputed’ grounds (where 
someone is erroneously thought to hold a particular political opinion or mistakenly 
believed to be a member of a religious sect) can satisfy the ‘refugee’ definition.”130  
The court in Amanfi recognized the doctrine of imputed gay identity relying on the 
holding of In re S-P-, and the proposed Attorney General regulation in 2000 that 
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would extend the imputed identity doctrine to all protected groups across the 
board.
131
   
 The imputed gay identity doctrine opens the door for asylum claims to a 
number of individuals that previously would have been denied.  Until this point, 
there has been an unrecognized difference between persecution based on 
knowledge, and persecution based on perception.  Most persecution stems from 
the perception of a persecutor and usually continues on this basis because of what 
they perceive the person to be.  Transgender persons who are persecuted because 
of their perceived deviation from gender expectations, and for whom persecution 
can be as much a gender-based phenomenon as sexual-orientation-based one, may 
now be able to bring a claim under the imputed identity doctrine.
132
 
 The idea in itself is not as far fetched as one might think.  Our domestic 
laws already allow for the perceptions of the bigoted public.  The Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act was enacted in 2009.  
The act protects against hate crimes performed domestically on account of an 
individual’s association with a certain group based on an immutable 
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characteristic.
133
  In addition to protecting against bigotry regarding race and color, 
the act also enumerates for crimes performed because of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.   
In general.--Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in any 
circumstance described in subparagraph (B) or paragraph (3), willfully causes 
bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous 
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to 
any person, because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person-
134
 
 
The most important language to take note of is “because of actual or perceived.”135  Our 
domestic law regarding persecution on account of an immutable or innate characteristic 
takes action for those who may not “be” but are merely “perceived to be.”  Whether the 
crime is performed based on knowledge that the individual is a homosexual or merely 
perceived to be; any violent action taken against them is considered a hate crime and 
subject to a harsher punishment if found guilty under the law.
 136
  The fact that our 
domestic laws enumerate for crimes based on perception suggests that the imputed 
identity doctrine of the Third Circuit is not as far fetched as some may think. 
VI. WHAT IS GAY ENOUGH? 
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 In claims brought for transgender or ambiguously gendered individuals, 
advocates should demonstrate how these individuals are marked by their male and 
female characteristics and the different ways that their client’s culture places 
emphasis on the nexus between a person’s outward appearance and his or her 
given sex.
137
  However, there are dangers regarding outward expression of sexual 
orientation.  Cases in which individuals are persecuted for their sexual identity or 
perceived sexual identity have involved individuals whose sexual identity has been 
outwardly represented.  Certain defenses have been raised against individuals 
whose outward appearance does not represent the stereotypical homosexual 
identity.  In the Matter of Soto Vega, an immigration judge refused to grant asylum 
because the individual’s homosexuality was not manifested through gendered 
traits of a homosexual.
138
  This decision is representative of a trend in immigration 
cases to equate visibility with the potential for anti-homosexual persecution.
139
  
The judge noted the credibility of the gay man who feared being returned to 
Mexico, but denied him relief because of his apparent non-“obvious” gay 
demeanor.
140
  The judge remarked that he saw nothing in the individual’s 
“appearance, dress, manner, demeanor, gestures, voice, or anything of nature that 
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approached some of the stereotypical things that society assesses to gays.”141  The 
judge noted that the individual “would not be apparently gay to most people.”142  
Also, if the individual returned to Mexico in some other community other than the 
one he was raised, the judge said that it would not be obvious that he was 
homosexual unless he made that obvious himself.
143
  It was because of this lack of 
visibility, the immigration judge concluded that Soto Vega had failed to 
“demonstrate a reasonable fear of future persecution.”144  The Matter of Soto Vega 
was affirmed by the BIA without opinion.
145
   
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the individual 
established a past persecution on account of his sexual identity and therefore a 
well-founded fear of future persecution should have been presumed established.
146
  
When the applicant establishes this past persecution, it is then the job of the 
government to rebut by showing circumstances in the country have changed or 
that the individual could reasonably relocate to another part of their native 
country.
147
  The court notes in using the phrase “must show,” the immigration 
judge did not afford the individual the presumption of a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.
148
  The court notes that the “clear probability” standard applies 
to withholding, rather than asylum, which requires only a showing of a reasonable 
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possibility.
149
  For that reason the court remanded back to the BIA to determine 
whether the government had properly rebutted the individual’s plea.150  If the 
government rebuts the individual’s well-founded fear of future persecution by 
establishing an alteration in the dynamics of the country or establishing that the 
persecution is localized, then there is a legitimate foundation for denying the 
individual’s claim for asylum.151  However, it is inappropriate to refuse asylum to 
the victim of persecution based on his or her sexual identity because the traits of 
that sexual identity are not apparent, or “obvious.” 
A. Covering  
The idea of a homosexual acting “normal” rather than “queer,” is known as 
homosexual covering- it is the process by which gay individuals alter their conduct 
to display only gender-typical traits, allowing others to ignore their sexual 
orientation.
152
  What occurred in the case of Matter of Soto Vega is known as 
reverse covering- this occurs when “straights…ask gays to perform according to 
stereotype,” which is exactly what the judge in this case did.153  The idea of 
reverse covering is rewarded in cases such as Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-
Reyes.
154
  Hernandez-Montiel granted asylum to a male applicant who began 
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dressing and acting like a woman at the age of twelve.
155
  The court distinguished 
this “particular social group” as a subset group of homosexuals that was made up 
of “gay men with female sexual identities;” and based its decision on female-
acting homosexual men being subjected to higher levels of abuse than male-acting 
homosexual men.
156
  In recognizing that there is a heightened level of abuse 
among more feminine male homosexuals, the court is distinguishing persecution 
of sexual minorities by how “gay” or “not gay” they are.  Persecution is 
persecution and should be treated as such.  The subjectivity of the courts analysis, 
relying on sights and comparison to stereotype is inappropriate in analyzing the 
immutable characteristic of sexual identity.  Compared with each other, 
Hernandez-Montiel and Soto Vega suggest that courts perceive gay asylum 
applicants on a covering spectrum, stretching from those who “act straight,” or 
cover, to those who “act gay,” or reverse cover.157   
Similarly, for religious asylum applicants, courts have considered whether 
the petitioner’s religion can be “readily identified.”158  Courts have observed that, 
like the other enumerated categories, the attributes of a particular social group 
must be recognizable.
159
  There is no visibility requirement for asylum, but it is a 
way of ascertaining whether persecution occurs “on account of” the protected 
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characteristic.
160
  In general, there must be a nexus between the applicant’s 
persecution and his or her protected characteristic.
161
  In order to fill this 
requirement, courts have suggested that as a base, it is necessary that “the 
persecutor could become aware” of the protected characteristic.162  
In the case of homosexuals, this requirement of visibility becomes 
somewhat of a predicament.  For many homosexuals, the visibility of their 
sexuality is inversely related to the fear that they feel as an individual; when fear 
increases, visibility of their homosexuality decreases.
163
  A study of homosexual 
persecution in Egypt revealed how an increasing public awareness that “colored 
underwear, long hair, and tattoos were all telltale signs” of homosexuality, and 
that led gay individuals to avoid these attributes.
164
  Additionally, a case involving 
a gay couple from Bangladesh, required the pair to “conduct themselves in a 
discreet manner,”165 because being visible would lead to “the possibility of being 
bashed by the police.”166  In these situations, it is the invisibility of sexuality rather 
than the visibility that acts as the nexus between the individual’s fear of 
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persecution and their homosexuality.
167
  If covering is considered a burden on the 
individual because they are required to hide their true identity for fear of 
persecution, then any voluntary covering is then arguably evidence that well-
founded fear exists.
168
  When fear of persecution forces a sexual minority to 
conform to the life of a straight person, “covering” infringes on conversion, which 
has been seen by American courts as persecution that meets the fear-based 
standard.
169
   
 In the concepts of asylum law, one is either homosexual, or not- (a member 
of a particular social group).
170
  Under asylum law, homosexuality is not treated as 
a behavior that lies on a gradual scale; but it is an immutable trait, unchangeable in 
nature.
171
  “An immutability- based legal standard for those persecuted on the 
basis of their sexual orientation must recognize that while some gay people are 
capable of resisting any expression of that orientation, they are still gay and not 
necessarily free from fear of persecution.”172 
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asks if a reasonable person would experience similar fear, Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 
1061 (9
th
 Cir. 1993), and requires further examination of what motivated the applicant’s 
invisibility.  
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undergo treatment” and when her “ex-girlfriend was … subjected to electric shock 
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 In Matter of Acosta, the BIA defined an immutable characteristic as one 
that individuals “either cannot change, or should not be required to change.”173  It 
is the inability of gay men to change their core sexual identity, separate from 
action, that immigration courts have consistently recognized, hence the inherent 
immutability in the trait.
174
  The problem is, when courts use a performance model 
and incorrectly assume that homosexual identity is constituted by action, they 
remove the immutable nature of the trait.  Additionally, it is ironic that 
homosexuals have been denied because their sexual orientation is not apparent and 
in the case of Amanfi v. Ashcroft, a heterosexual individual was perceived to be 
gay and thus was granted asylum based on persecution from this perception.
175
  In 
essence, a heterosexual was homosexual enough at this point to qualify for 
asylum, yet in these cases that involve reverse covering, a homosexual may be 
denied asylum based on lack of perception he is the person he claims to be.
176
  
This is just a roundabout way of saying to those who are victimized, “if you can 
hide it, then do it - problem solved.”  This idea would be unheard of if said straight 
forwardly; but essentially that is all these decisions amount to.  Homosexuality 
was not originally enumerated, nor has homosexuality been as implemented in our 
society as it is today; but placed under the context of religion, roundabout or 
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straightforward, the notion of covering or reverse covering would be unthinkable 
if suggested.  With a firm defense under the First Amendment, and an enumerated 
group in asylum law, telling someone to hide their religion if they can to avoid 
persecution is unthinkable and the same thought process should be used by the 
court in their review of asylum cases based on sexual identity.  
CONCLUSION 
So what does all of this interpretation and expansion mean?  Sexual and gender 
minorities seeking asylum for persecution place the courts between a rock and a 
hard place.  The alien applicants must possess a genuine fear of persecution and 
there has to be a reasonable possibility that the persecution will occur.
177
   They 
have to establish that they are being individually targeted for persecution or that 
they are being persecuted because of their association with “a particular social 
group,” one that has not yet been defined in most cases for these minorities.178   
The Attorney General has stipulated after much debate, that though not 
enumerated as one of the original categories, homosexuality does constitute a 
“particular social group,” under which individuals suffering persecution because 
of their association with the group, may seek asylum.
179
  Though this is progress, it 
isn’t enough.  “Homosexual” as understood by the courts, does not automatically 
connote “sexual or gender minority.”  Theses individuals who don’t fit the binary 
                                                 
177
 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. &. N. Dec. at 225. 
178
 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2008). 
179
 Opinion of Attorney General Order No. 1895-94 (1994); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 
I. & N. Dec. at 819. 
 36 
system of gay male/female, or straight male/female, are going to have a much 
more difficult time establishing their connection with a particular social group 
under which they asylum may be claimed.  So where do we look?  Well the circuit 
spilt of interpretation of course.  
 The First,
180
 Third,
181
 and Seventh Circuits
182
 require the particular group 
the alien claims they're a part of, share a common immutable characteristic.  
Immutable to these courts means unchangeable and ingrained, this presents a 
problem for individuals whose “particular social group,” is made up of people who 
can remove their outward expressions.  The Ninth Circuit however, in saying that 
if the individuals are united by voluntary association or an innate characteristic 
that is fundamental to their identity and it cannot or should not be changed, well 
then they qualify as a “particular social group.”183  This standard allows for the 
individual, if represented by an outward expression of their inner core identity, to 
be protected from persecution because it is a fundamental piece of who they are as 
a person.  These traits should be accepted even if they have been acquired 
overtime as the individual accepted and associated with their true identity.
184
  This 
brightens the possibilities for sexual minorities, because hypothetically, even if the 
individual is a straight sounding, masculine mannered male, but they wear 
woman’s clothing because they are transgender, and their identity is a straight 
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female trapped in a man’s body; this outward expression of their core gender 
identity should allow them to claim asylum under a particular social group if 
persecuted, and be granted asylum because of who they are at their core.   
The Second Circuit analyzes the perception of the persecutor.
185
  If someone is 
persecuted because of who they are perceived to be and that perception is 
incorrect, they should still be able to claim asylum under that particular social 
group.  This standard is important.  We incorporate it into our domestic 
protections so why not integrate it into our international protections?
186
  If identity 
is imputed based on the perceptions of another, those perceptions should be 
protected against regardless of their truth when it comes to the individual’s actual 
identity.
187
  This will allow for those who may not have come to terms with how to 
identify themselves, and those who simply don’t understand the concept of sexual 
deviation, but know that this sexual or gender difference is core to their person, or 
has been recognized and imputed upon them because of the perceptions of 
someone else; they should be afforded the ability to seek asylum protection, 
because the alternative is victimization for something that they cannot control. 
 That is the overlying idea that the courts must remember in moving forward 
when looking at asylum based on sexual and gender minority; the theme among 
these individuals, regardless of what “particular social group” of sexual or gender 
differentiation they associate themselves with, just like members of the 
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enumerated categories, the alternative to acceptance is victimization with the 
possibility of death.  A fusion between the standard of the Second Circuit and the 
Ninth Circuit would provide the most alternatives for sexual and gender based 
asylum seekers, enumerating for non-immutable but still innate characteristics and 
the perceptions of the persecutor not just the identity of the victim.  These 
decisions should never be made on the basis of what outward exhibition is being 
made versus what characteristics seem to suggest that they can hide their true 
identity.
188
  The risk with this and one that surely has caused the courts to be so 
tentative in expanding the definitions of what constitutes “a particular social 
group” in relation to the non-physical characteristics of sexual and gender 
minorities; is lying.  It is hard to lie in regards to race, religion, nationality, and 
even political association; however, the greatest risk to a broad interpretation of 
the standard is lying.  There is no answer to solving this problem and it revolves 
around trust.  When looking at evidence of persecution, the applicant’s testimony 
is sufficient.  The courts trust the applicant to tell a truthful story that establishes 
fear upon which they seek asylum.  That same trust is what must move the courts 
forward to broaden the interpretation of how someone can associate with a 
particular social group and what would constitute the creation of that group.  There 
will be individuals who will try to take advantage of this system, but in order for 
sexual and gender minorities to receive adequate protection from persecution 
based on these immutable or innate characteristics; the courts need to trust that 
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those seeking asylum are doing so because they have a well-founded fear of 
persecution and possible death for being who they are.                 
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